The Status of a Fetus in Halacha: What is the Definition of Life? (Part 2)

Previously, we began our halachic discussion about the status of a fetus by asking some profound and fascinating questions about life itself, such as:

1.  When does life begin?
2.  What is the definition of life?
3.  What is the status of a fetus?
4.  Does it depend on how old the fetus is?
5.  What is the issur of abortion?
6.  Are there ever cases where abortion is allowed? If so, when? And why?
7.  Are we allowed to sacrifice a fetus in order to save its mother’s life?
8.  Can we violate Shabbos to save a fetus?

Now, let us begin to consider the possible answers to these questions.

Because the primary Torah sources are quite ambiguous regarding the status of a fetus, there have been several different approaches found within the Rishonim and Achronim regarding the nature of the issur of abortion. Let us begin analyzing the spectrum of this sugya:

1. Murder (Retzichah)

The most obvious classification for the issur of abortion would be murder. [As we will soon discuss, Rav Moshe Feinstein famously suggested that this was the opinion of the Rambam.] However, we still have to contend with the various questions and problems with this approach. For example, why wouldn't the onesh (consequence) for abortion be murder, as with a normal case of retzichah?

To solve this problem, we could make a distinction between the category of murder and the punishment of being chayiv missah (receiving the death penalty). In other words, just because one violates the issur of retzichah does not necessarily mean they receive a chiyuv missah. For example, if someone kills a treifah (loosely defined as one who will die within the upcoming year because of a physiological problem), everyone seems to agree that they are not chayiv missah. Similarly, if one kills a goses (loosely defined as one on his deathbed), many shitos believe that they would not be chayiv missah.

[The Rambam (Hilchos Roteach 2:7),[1] however, maintains that one is chayiv missah for killing a goses. His svara is likely as follows: as opposed to a treifah, the goses' condition is natural (time is killing him), whereas the treifah is being killed by an unnatural wound. Tosafos (Niddah 44b), in contrast, believes that one is pattur for killing a goses.]

The svara for not being chayiv missah for killing a treifah or a goses would be as follows:

1. Either this is not considered an act of murder, since the quality and quantity of life was such that severing it does not qualify as an act of murder.
2. Or, this is, in fact defined as an act of murder; but due to the nature of the life that was taken, it doesn't qualify as the type of murder that deserves a chiyuv missah. In other words, this is a less severe act of murder, since there was “less life” that was taken.

This second approach might be found in the wording of Tosafos (Niddah 44b), who state that one is pattur for killing a goses. While this could mean that there is no issur at all, the Mishmaros Kehunah (Arachin 7a)[2] suggests that the lashon (wording) of Tosafos implies that there still is an issur, but not an issur that is severe enough to warrant a chiyuv missah.

The svara goes even deeper: the reason one receives the death penalty for killing someone is because of middah k'neged middah, measure for measure. When one violates a prohibited act, they receive exactly that which they inflicted upon someone else. If one kills someone, severing a soul from its body, the consequence, and atonement, is to receive the same: the severing of one’s own soul from their body. This is also why the onesh for accidentally killing someone is galus (exile). You caused someone's soul to leave this world, taking away their place in this world. Thus, instead of completely losing their place in this world, they simply lose their physical place, their makom, and they must journey into exile to atone for their sin.

Thus, when one kills a treifah or goses, the quality and quantity of life that was taken is such that the middah k'neged middah might not be the death penalty. While still a heinous act, and while still defined as murder, it would not qualify as an act that creates a chiyuv missah.

We can apply this same principle to abortion. While a fetus might be considered alive, and a nefesh, it might not yet possess the status of a full human being. (The Maharal (Chidushei Aggados on Niddah 30b), for example, suggests that the fetus is in a state where its neshamah is not yet entirely inside its body.) So while it might still be classified as murder to abort a fetus, it might be less severe form of murder, and thus not qualify as an act that receives the death penalty. This is how Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Choshen Mishpat 2:69)[3] understands the issur of abortion: the fetus is a nefesh, and abortion is thus defined as murder. But abortion is not a severe enough act of murder to receive the death penalty.

2. Chavlah (Wounding)

(Potentially a Subcategory of Murder)

The Maharit[4] suggests the the issur of abortion is chavalah (wounding). In general, there is an issur to wound both another person and oneself. The Gemara (Baba Kama 91b) compares the issur of of chavalah to three other issurim: bal tashchis (wasting), tza'ar (causing pain), retzichah (murder).[5]

When analyzing this topic, the question becomes, is chavalah:

• A combination of all three of these categories?
• Similar to all three of these categories?
• Something fundamentally different than all three categories, but still somewhat related?

Additionally, is chavlah equally related to all three of these categories, or does it lean more towards one of them? To illustrate, if chavalah is most closely related to bal tashchis, (as wounding oneself can be seen as wasting a part of the human body,) then it would only be assur if it was done for no reason. If, however, was it done for a tzorech (need), it should be muttar, just like bal tashchis is permitted when it is done for any need.[6] For example, one can burn their clothes if they need to keep warm by a fire.

Tosafos[7] and the Pnei Yehoshua[8] suggest that in order for it to be muttar to violate chavalah on oneself, it must be for a great need.  As such, a minor benefit would not be enough, and it would still be assur. This seems to indicate a greater distinction between chavalah and ba'al tashchis.[9]

To explain Tosafos' and the Pnei Yehoshua's shitah, it is likely that they maintain that chavalah is more closely related to the issur of retzichah, albeit a much lower form. When one kills someone, they cause the person's soul to leave their entire body, whereas if one severs someone's limb, they only "kill" a small piece of the person, and the person themselves will still live on. If this is the case, it still makes sense that for a tzorech, one would be allowed to wound themselves. And even Tosfos, who argues that it is even assur to wound oneself for a tzorech, would agree with the Pnei Yeshoshua that for a tzorech gadol (a great need), such as saving one's one life, it would be muttar to wound oneself, since they would be sacrificing a small part of themselves (blood, an open wound, or a limb) in order to save their life. This is why it is permitted to enter life-saving surgery, even if one's body will be cut open and they will lose some blood.[10]

A Major Question: Whose Chavalah?

While the Maharit suggests that the issur of abortion is chavalah, a major question remains: is the Maharit suggesting that the issur is wounding the mother, or is the issur wounding the fetus?

1. Chavalah of the Mother

If the problem of abortion is wounding the mother, there are two ways of understanding it:

• The mother will likely be cut or hurt while the fetus is aborted.
• The fetus itself is considered a limb of the mother (uber yerech imo). Thus, aborting a fetus is like cutting out an actual limb from the mother's body.

2. Chavalah of the Fetus

If aborting the fetus is a violating of chavalah against the fetus itself, we would have to explain the Maharit’s svara as follows: because the fetus is not yet a full nefesh, abortion would not violate the full issur of retzichah. However, since the fetus is still a "partial” nefesh/person, abortion would still "partially” violate the issur of murder; the Maharit would therefore be suggesting that chavalah is the best way to categorize this type of issur. If one chops off someone's arm, they violate a miniature or partial form of murder. So too, if someone aborts a fetus, they violate a miniature or partial form of murder.

Nafka Minah

A potential practical difference between these two approaches is whether one can do an abortion for the health of the mother.

If chavalah is a problem of wounding the mother, then it would likely be muttar to perform an abortion for the sake of the mother’s health, since one can wound oneself for the sake of their improving their own health. However, it might only be allowed if it will save the mother's life (a tzaruch gadol).

If, however, chavalah is a problem of wounding the fetus, then we can suggest a few possibilities:

1. One cannot abort the fetus, since one cannot wound someone else for the sake of improving their own health.

2. One can only abort the fetus if it is to save the life of the mother, because for pikuach nefesh, chavalah would be muttar. And even if normally once cannot wound someone else in order to save their own life, since the mother has a unique relationship with the fetus, as the fetus is dependent on her, the mother might be allowed to abort the fetus to save her life.[11]

3. One cannot abort the fetus, even to save the life of the mother, because chavalah is a form of murder, and one cannot murder someone in order to save their own life, even if it is only a lower form of murder.

In our next article, we will continue to analyze this fascinating halachic topic.

[1] רמב"ם הלכות רוצח ושמירת הנפש פרק ב הלכה ז

אחד ההורג את הבריא או את החולה הנוטה למות, ואפילו הרג את הגוסס נהרג עליו, ואם היה גוסס בידי אדם כגון שהכוהו עד שנטה למות והרי הוא גוסס, ההורג אותו אין בית דין ממיתין אותו

[2] משמרות כהונה מסכת ערכין דף ז עמוד א

כתבו התוס' שם בנדה דעובר אף דשרי להורגו מחללין עליו את השבת כדין גוסס דההורג את הגוסס פטור ומחללין את השבת ע"ש והא דפריך הכא תנינא י"ל משום דהא מילתא דשרי להורגו ומחללין שמעי' לה מדין גוסס אבל ק"ל ע"ד הגמ' בסנהדרין דע"ב ע"ב גבי בא במחתרת דאם יש לו דמים הוא דמפקחין עליו את הגל אבל אם אין לו דמים אין מפקחין דכיון דשרי להורגו אין מפקחין ע"ש בפי' רש"י וה"נ בעובר כיון דשרי להורגו אין מפקחין ע"ש ושאני גוסס דאף דהורגו פטור היינו ממיתה אבל איסורא דאורייתא איכא ועיין להתוס' בחולין דל"ג ע"א שכ' בפשי' דעובר אסור להורגו ע"ש וכן מסיק הרדב"ז ח"ב סי' תרצ"ה ולא זכר דברי התוס' הללו ע"ש.

[3] שו"ת אגרות משה חושן משפט חלק ב סימן סט

שהריגת עובר אסורה באסור רציחה

[4] שו"ת מהרי"ט חלק א סימן צז

ובפ"ב דחולין אין מזמנין גוי על בני מעיים וכתב שם התוספות נהי דפטור על הנפלי' אבל לא שרי וכו' דהא דאסור מדין חבלה הוא

[5] When we discuss the topic of suicide, we will provide a much more in-depth analysis of both this Gemara and the issur of chavalah.

[6] See Rambam Sefer HaMitzvot (Lavin n. 57); Rambam (Melachim 6:10).

[7] תוספות מסכת בבא קמא דף צא עמוד ב

אלא האי תנא הוא דתניא מקרעין כו' - וא"ת ומאי ס"ד השתא וכי על זה צריך להביא ראיה דמקרע בגדים עובר משום בל תשחית ואור"י דאין מביא ראיה אלא שאסור לחבול אפי' לצורך כגון אשה שטפחה על ראשה וכן ההיא דאך את דמכם שהרג את עצמו בשביל שום דבר שירא וכן מקרע על המת זהו לצורך.

[8] פני יהושע מסכת בבא קמא דף צא עמוד ב

בד"ה אלא האי תנא כו' ואומר ר"י דאין מביא ראיה אלא שאסור לחבול אפילו לצורך עכ"ל. פי' דבכה"ג בבגדים נמי לא פשיטא ליה, ואף על גב דקרא דבל תשחית כתיב במצור דהוי לצורך המלחמה ואפ"ה אסור כבר כתבתי דאיירי בענין שיכול למצוא אילני סרק אבל בלא"ה ודאי שרי, ולהיפך נמי לא שייך להקשות מדשרי רחמנא אפילו עץ מאכל היכא דליכא אילני סרק מכלל דלצורך שרי, די"ל התם שאני שהוא צורך גדול וסכנת נפשות ובכה"ג באמת אפילו בחובל בעצמו שרי היכא דאיכא צורך גדול כדאשכחן בשאול, אבל עיקר פלוגתא דתנאי דהכא היינו דאיכא צורך קצת. אלא דיש לדקדק דלמאי דס"ד עכשיו דבל תשחית דגופו אתיא במכ"ש משאר מילי וא"כ על כרחך הא דקתני לעיל דנשבע להרע בעצמו מיקרי רשות היינו בענין דאיכא צורך קצת דבלא"ה כו"ע מודו דאסור מקרא דבל תשחית וכ"ש גופו, א"כ מעיקרא אמאי מהדר לאוקמי המשניות כתנאי וכן תרתי עובדי דר"ע ואמאי לא משני דהא דקאמר רשאי איירי לצורך ובמתני' דקאמר שאינו רשאי היינו שלא לצורך, ואף על גב דעובדא דאשה הוי לצורך י"ל דלא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא לצורך אלא אפילו החובל בעצמו שלא לצורך והוי מקלקל גמור אפ"ה אחרים חייבין עליו. ויש ליישב דכיון דעובדא דאשה איירי לצורך לא הוה ליה למיתני סתמא החובל בעצמו אף על פי שאינו רשאי אי ס"ד דדוקא שלא לצורך איירי הוה ליה לפרושי דסתמא משמע לצורך דומיא דעובדא דאשה ממש אבל לגבי בשת משני שפיר דהתם ליכא למיטעי דהוי דומיא דעובדא דאשה דהא קתני בהדיא החובל ודו"ק:

[9] Avoiding pain and suffering would most probably be seen as a great need, and would therefore allow one to enter into a surgical procedure. This, however, would potentially prohibit optional surgeries such as certain cosmetic surgeries, unless one thinks this qualifies as a great need.

[10] In the future, we will provide an in-depth discussion on the topic of risking one’s life to save a life, as well as the heter to risk one’s life in order to prolong their own life.

[11] We will soon see several Gemaras and mekoros to support this svara.