The Status of a Fetus in Halacha: What is the Definition of Life? (Part 12)

Now that we have developed a more sophisticated understanding of the sugya of rodef, we can revisit the Rambam's famous shitah on abortion and try to understand it in greater depth. Let us begin by briefly reviewing the Rambam's formulation:

רמב"ם הלכות רוצח ושמירת הנפש פרק א הלכה ח/ט

אחד מבושיו, ואחד כל דבר שיש בו סכנת נפשות, אחד האיש שאחז את האשה, ענין הכתוב שכל החושב להכות חבירו הכייה הממיתה אותו מצילין את הנרדף בכפו של רודף, ואם אינן יכולין מצילין אותו אף בנפשו, שנ' ב לא תחוס עינך.

הרי זו מצות לא תעשה שלא לחוס על נפש הרודף. לפיכך הורו חכמים שהעוברה שהיא מקשה לילד מותר לחתוך העובר במיעיה בין בסם בין ביד מפני שהוא כרודף אחריה להורגה, ואם משהוציא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש וזהו טבעו של עולם

The first important detail of note is the location the Rambam chose to codify the halacha of abortion, namely, in the context of his discussion of a rodef (pursuer). The Rambam states that "there is a negative commandment against having mercy on a rodef.  Therefore, the Sages taught that a fetus that makes it difficult for the mother/pregnancy, one is allowed to cut the fetus within her belly, either with a drug or by hand, because the fetus is like a rodef (pursuer) that is trying to kill the mother. However, once the head of the fetus leaves the womb, we can't touch it, because we can't choose one soul over another, and this is the nature of the world." The Shulchan Aruch quotes the Rambam's lashon verbatim.

The Rambam's lashon is striking, and a couple questions immediately arise:

• There was no mention of the fetus being a "rodef" in the Mishna or the Gemara. Where did the Rambam get this from? And even if the Rambam is emphasizing the end of the Gemara which says "Shamayim Ka'Radfeh Leih- Heaven is the rodef," nowhere does the Gemara say that until then, the fetus was a rodef? Furthermore, the Rambam himself doesn't even use this terminology when quoting the end of the Gemara, but exchanges the words "Shamayim Ka'Radfeh Leih" for, "V'Zeh Tevo Shel Olam", which means "this is the nature of the world." This requires explanation.

• How can a fetus be a rodef? A fetus has no intent or awareness, so it can’t be said that the fetus is “trying” to kill the mother? Is the Rambam saying that even without conscious intent, a fetus can be rodef? Furthermore, what changes once the fetus leaves the womb? If anything, it should continue to be a rodef after it is born as well? Furthermore, why isn't the mother considered to be rodef towards the fetus while the fetus is still in the womb? Why would the fetus be considered a rodef, but not the mother? Again, this requires explanation.

Two Ways of Approaching the Rambam

As we will soon see, the most important factor in understanding the Rambam's shitah is determining whether the Rambam holds that a fetus is considered to be a nefesh.

1. The Fetus is a Nefesh

The following two explanations (of Rav Chaim Soloveichik and Rav Moshe Feinstein) are based on the premise that the Rambam considers a fetus to be a nefesh. According to these two shitos, it is only because the fetus is considered to be a nefesh that the Rambam chose to use the concept of "rodef" in explaining why we can sacrifice the fetus to save the life of the mother. Let us begin with the shitah of Rav Chaim Soloveichik:

1) Shitas Ha'Grach: The Fetus is a Partial Nefesh and it's a Unique Din of Rodef

Rav Chaim Soloveichik (The Gra’ch)[1] formulates a beautiful and sophisticated way of explaining the Rambam's unique shitah. Rav Soloveichik suggests that the normal heter to kill a rodef requires both a chiyuv missah for the rodef and the hatzalas ha'nirdaf.

In other words, we are normally not allowed to kill one person to save another; however, because the rodef is engaging in an act of attempted murder, there is a special din of chiyuv missah on the rodef that allows for the hatzalas ha'nirdaf with the life of the rodef. However, on a fundamental level, saving the nirdaf is not enough of a reason to kill the rodef; it is only part of the story, and only one of the two contributing factors; the other factor is the din missah that the rodef receives for attempting to kill the nirdaf.[2]

Regarding the status of a fetus, Rav Chaim believes that while a fetus is not yet a full nefesh, it is still enough of a nefesh that aborting a fetus would violate the issur of retzichah.

However, when the only way to save the life of the pregnant mother is to abort her fetus, there is a very unique halachic reality that comes into play: in this situation, the mother is a full nefesh, while the fetus is still only a partial nefesh. In a normal case, the fetus would not be a rodef, because is not chayiv missah, as

1. The fetus has no intention to harm the mother.
2. The fetus is not directly performing any action of attempted murder.

Thus, even though we do have the factor of hatzalas ha'nirdaf (saving the mother) present, this would normally not be enough to kill a potential rodef; we normally need both hatzalas ha'nirdaf and the chiyuv missah of the rodef.

However, in this case, Rav Chaim is michadeish that since the fetus is only a partial nefesh and the mother is a full nefesh, the din of rodef can apply to the fetus even when we only have the factor of hatzalas ha'nirdaf – even though the fetus is not chayiv missah. Thus, in this case, we would be allowed to sacrifice the fetus to save the life of the mother.[3]

However, the moment the fetus is born and comes into the world, it becomes a full nefesh as well. Thus, the moment the fetus is born, we can no longer sacrifice the fetus to save the mother, because now there is no rodef (no chiyuv missah) and there is no longer the ability to use the unique svara of hatzalas ha'nirdaf, since both the mother and the fetus are now full nefashos and therefore equal; consequently, we cannot choose one over the other.

This explains why the Rambam applies the din of rodef while the fetus is in the womb, but not once the fetus is born; because once the fetus is born, this unique din of hatzalas ha’nirdaf no longer applies, and we must leave it up to the natural course of the world, because "ain docheh nefesh mipnei nefesh."

 2) Rav Moshe Feinstein: The Fetus is a Full Nefesh and it's a Full Rodef

As we previously mentioned, Rav Moshe Feinstein holds that a fetus is a full nefesh, and even though one is not chayiv missah for aborting a fetus, it still violates the issur of retzichah.[4] Fascinatingly, Rav Moshe Feinstein[5] also thinks that one does not need intent in order to qualify as a rodef: the very fact that one is the cause of someone else's death would give them the status of a rodef.  It becomes clear that Rav Moshe thinks the din of rodef is about hatzalas ha'nirdaf, saving the life of the one in danger. As such, the rodef never needs to be chayiv missah or even be in the act of violating the issur of retzichah in order to qualify as a rodef; just being the cause of someone else's death is enough for someone to qualify as a rodef.

This creates a truly fascinating way of approaching the Rambam's formulation; in the case of a fetus, even though the fetus can be seen as endangering its mother, the concept of should not be limited to the fetus alone. The mother – who needs to sacrifice the fetus in order to save her life – should be considered a rodef as well.[6]

If this is the case, then since we have two full nefashos in the picture, and each of them needs to sacrifice the life of the other one in order to survive, we should be back to the principle of ain docheh nefesh mipnei nefesh, and the fetus should not be sacrificed to save the mother. Why, then, does the Rambam state that only the fetus is a rodef, implying that the mother is not?

Rav Moshe offers a tremendous chidush, suggesting that even though both the fetus and the mother should really both rodfim, the unique status of the fetus fundamentally impacts the halachic nature of the situation. Even though the fetus is enough of a nefesh that it would violate the issur of retzichah if one killed it, it still is not a completely full nefesh. As such, when we have two rodfim who are endangering each other, but one is a full nefesh and the other is not, we only consider the fetus (the partial nefesh) to be a rodef, and the mother's status as a rodef falls away. In other words, the fetus' status as rodef knocks out the mother's status of rodef through the mechanism of bittul.[7] In the competing statuses of rodef, the fetus' form of redifus is stronger – since it is endangering a full nefesh, and thus knocks out the mother's status as a competing rodef – who is only endangering a partial nefesh.

Rav Moshe explains that once the fetus comes out, everything really stays the same. The only shift is that now, since the fetus has become a completely full nefesh, the mother's level of redifus is equal to that of the fetus. As such, the mother no longer loses her status as a rodef, as it is no longer knocked out by the redifus of the newborn child, and we would no longer we able to choose to save the mother's life by sacrificing the newborn child.

Nafkah Minos

1. Once the Fetus Leaves the Womb, is the Baby Still a Rodef?

This is a major nafka minah between Rav Moshe's shitah and the Rav Chaim Soloveichik's shitah.

Rav Chaim holds that once the fetus leaves the womb, it loses its status as a lower-level rodef, because the svara of hatzalas ha'nirdaf alone is no longer strong enough to apply to full nefesh.

Rav Moshe, however, holds that once the fetus leaves the womb, the mother no longer loses her status of a rodef; as such, the fetus and the mother would now both be rodfim, simultaneously, preventing us from choosing one life over another.

2. Can the Mother Herself Sacrifice the Baby to Save Her Life

According to Rav Chaim Soloveichik, once the fetus leaves the womb, it loses its status as a rodef. As such, since there is no longer a rodef present, it is obvious that we cannot sacrifice the mother or the baby to save the life of the other.

However, according to Rav Moshe Feinstein, once the fetus leaves the womb, both the mother and the fetus now have the status of a full rodef; and while we, as a third party, cannot choose to sacrifice one life to save another, it is very possible that the mother herself (if she so wishes) has the right to sacrifice the baby to save her own life – since the fetus still has the status of a rodef.[8]

In our next article, we will continue to analyze this fascinating halachic topic.

[1] חידושי ר' חיים הלוי הלכות רוצח ושמירת הנפש פרק א

אשר לפי זה נראה לומר בדעת הרמב"ם, דלהכי הוא שכתב טעמא דהעובר הוא כרודף אחריה להרגה, משום דס"ל דבדין פקוח נפש של כל התורה כולה באמת הוי דינא דגם עובר הוא בכלל נפש ואינו נדחה מפני נפש אחרים, ואם באנו להציל נפש בנפשו של העובר היכא דלא הוי רודף הוי דינא דאין מצילין, ועל כן גם הכא אם באנו לדון משום דין פקוח נפש של כל התורה לא היה העובר נדחה מפני נפשה של האם, ורק בדין הצלה האמורה בנרדף הוא דהוי דינא דעובר נדחה בהצלה זו, וזהו שכתב הרמב"ם טעמא דהרי הוא כרודף אחריה להרגה. 

וע"כ מפרש הרמב"ם דהוא דין מסויים בדין הצלה האמורה בנרדף דעובר נדחה בפני נפש הגמור, ולהכי הוא שחותכין אותו בהצלת האם, ושאני מכל פקוח נפש דעלמא, וזהו שכתב טעמא שהרי הוא כרודף אחריה להרגה, וכמו שנתבאר.......

גבי עובר דנדחה בפני האם, ומשום דבדין הצלת נרדף הוי דינא דעובר נדחה בפני נפש הגמור, וזהו דתנן דעד שלא יצא ראשו חותכין אותו, ונפשו נדחה מעצם דין רודף גם בלא חיובא דרודף, משא"כ ביצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו, משום דאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש כי אם בצירוף חיובא דרודף, והכא לית ביה הך חיובא, משום דמשמיא קא רדפי לה.

[2] As we suggested previously, this can be understood as either due to the “rishus ha’gavra” of the rodef or the fact that we consider it as if the rodef already succeeded in killing the nirdaf.

[3] This could also be because the svara of “Mei Chazis” might not apply here, because a full life is more valuable than a partial life. Or, it could be because the fetus’ life is tafel to the mother's life, since the mother is the source of the fetus' existence.

[4] Thus, even though it might not be as full of a nefesh as its mother, it is still considered a full nefesh in regards to violating the issur of retzichah.

[5] שו"ת אגרות משה יורה דעה חלק ב סימן ס

דהא כתבתי שהא דאסור להרגו משום דמשמיא קא רדפי אינו מחמת שאינו בדין רודף כיון שהוא דרך טבעי שלא בכוונת רדיפה, אלא דכיון דמשמיא רדפי לה נחשבו שניהם כרודפים זה את זה מאחר שא"א שיחיו שניהם שלכן אסור מטעם מאי חזית, וא"כ לא שייך זה אלא כשהם רודפים שוים כהא דיצא ראשו שהוא נפש גמור כמו האם, אבל בעובר שעדיין אינו נפש גמור כדחזינן שאין נהרגין עליו, ונמצא שעל היתרון של האם מהעובר שהיא נפש גמור והוא אינו עדיין נפש גמור, הוי רק העובר רודף והאם אינה רודפת, לכן יש להעובר דין רודף מחמת יתרון זה שיש להאם עליו.

וניחא לפ"ז גם מה שתנן ברישא /אהלות פ"ז מ"ו/ בהא דמחתכין את הולד במעיה מפני שחייה קודמין לחייו, דלכאורה לשון זה אינו מדוקדק, דהא ההיתר הוא מחמת שעדיין אינו נפש ולא נחשב עדיין חי ולא שייך לומר שחייה קודמין לחייו, שמשמע שגם הוא חי אך חייה קודמין, ועיין בתפא"י שעמד בזה ופירושו דחוק. אבל למה שבארתי ניחא דודאי גם העובר נחשב חי כדחזינן דיש גם עליו איסור לא תרצח כמו לנולד, אך שמ"מ מותר מטעם שחייה קודמין לחייו דהרי יש בה עדיפות לענין החיות שהיא נפש גמור שלכן נחשבת יותר חי מהעובר ועל יתרון זה הוי רק העובר רודף ולא האשה ולכן מותר לחותכו, וזהו מה שנראה נכון בדברי הרמב"ם ולשון המשנה. [אחר איזו שנים שהוצאוני השי"ת בחסדיו הגדולים והבאתי אל המדינה הזאת מצאתי שנדפס חדושי הגאון רבינו חיים הלוי זצ"ל, וראיתי באורו על הרמב"ם בדבר נכון מאד, אבל גם מה שכתבתי ג"כ נכון וראיה מהירושלמי והרבה פנים לתורה].

[6] And as a third party, if someone steps in to save the mother's life, they are acting on behalf of the mother as her shaliach; according to this logic, if a doctor is performing the abortion (and thus representing the mother as her shaliach), they should take on the mother's status as a rodef as well.

[7] Similar to all cases of bittul, where one thing gets halachically knocked out by another.

[8] The Chavtzalas Ha'Sharon (Rav Mordechai Carlbach) creatively uses this svara to explain the words that Dasan and Avirum say to Moshe: "Who are you to do anything to us?!"

Dasan and Avirum were trying to kill each other; thus, they were both rodfim against each other. As such, Moshe was unable to save either of them by killing the other, because he was unable to choose one life over the other.