The Status of a Fetus in Halacha: What is the Definition of Life? (Part 3)

Until this point, we saw the opinions that abortion either violates a form of retzichah or the issur of chavalah– which itself might be a subcategory of retzichah. As we will soon see, there several other similar and related formulations within the Rishonim and the Achronim.

 3.  Abortion is Assur D'Oraisa: But Not Murder

Another way to explain the less severe punishment for abortion is to disconnect the issur of abortion from the issur of murder. Accordingly, while it may still be assur d'Oraisa to abort a fetus, it is not murder, and this explains the less severe punishment for its violation.

Some Achronim go as far as to give a potential nafka minah that would result from this. The Gemara[1] states that one is not allowed to kill someone in order to save their own life. Thus, if abortion is not murder (since a fetus is not a nefesh), then one would be allowed to abort a fetus in order to save their own life.[2] While this is a complicated sugya that requires much more analysis,[3] this nafka minah still displays the important consequences that can result, depending on how we classify the issur of abortion.

The question now becomes, if the issur D'Oraisa of abortion is not murder, what is it? There are several possible answers that are suggested.

1) Stealing

Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbauch was of the opinion that abortion violates the issur of stealing, because according to halacha, the fetus belongs to the father (Baba Kama 48b-49a).[4] Thus, when one aborts a fetus, they have stolen the child from their father.

2) The Issur Comes Mi'Svara (From Logic)

Some of the Achronim offer a very interesting argument, suggesting that the issur of abortion comes from the fact that there is a chiyuv hatzalah (an obligation to save the fetus) if the fetus’ life is in danger. As such, if there is an obligation to save its life, there must also be an issur to abort the fetus.

To understand this approach, we need to first try to determine where the chiyuv hatzalah stems from. There are several options:

A) The Gemara in Sanhedrin brings two Torah sources that teach us the chiyuv to save someone else’s life:

• Loh Sa'amod Al Dam Rei'echa- One should not stand idely by the blood of his brother.
• Hasheivosa Loh- when one's life is in danger, one should "return it" to him.

B) The Gemara in Yoma (85a-b) brings two sources to teach us that one can violate any mitzvah in order to save a life:

• V'Chai Bahem- Hashem gave us the mitzvos to "live" by them, not to die by them.
• Chalal Shabbos Achas Kidei Lishmor Shabbos Harbei- One violate one "Shabbos" in order to keep many future Shabbasos.

Even if we were to argue that the fetus is not fully alive, and therefore, these sources might not apply to a fetus, the principle of Chalal Shabbos Achas Kidei Lishmor Shabbos Harbei is a question of potential, and would therefore likely still apply to the fetus. This, in fact, is the opinion of the Ramban[5] and several other Rishonim.

Thus, if there is a mitzvah to save the life of a fetus, aborting a fetus would logically be problematic. How problematic, though, is still a question that needs to be answered. Is aborting a fetus only a bittul aseh (violation of a positive commandment), because one did not save the life of the fetus life? Or, is the fact that there is a mitzvah to save the life of a fetus a sign that abortion is a full-fledged issur? The achronim debate this very issue.[6]

4. Abortion is Not Issur D'Oraisa: It is Only Assur Dirabanan

On the other end of the spectrum, some Rishonim seem to imply that there is actually no issur D’Oraisa of abortion at all. Thus, at least on a Torah level, there would be no issur of abortion.

Tosafos[7] quotes the Gemara in Erchin (7a) which states that one can be mechalel Shabbos (violate Shabbos) in order to save a fetus. Tosafos then states, explicitly, that this is true, even though it is muttar to abort a fetus. The lashon of muttar clearly implies that in the eyes of Tosafos, there is no issur of abortion.

Nevertheless, many Achronim suggest that Tosafos would still agree that abortion is assur Dirabanan.[8]

The Svara

There is definitely room to explain why one would think that abortion is only assur Dirabanan. For example, this would explain why the onesh (consequence) for abortion is not equivalent to murder; it would be due to that that the fetus is not yet considered alive. Nevertheless, as many shitos show, there is plenty of room to push back against such an extreme approach.

How Connected is the Mitzvah to Save a Fetus to the Issur of Abortion?

A powerful question arises:

If it is muttar, at least on a D’Oraisa level, to abort a fetus, how is it muttar to violate Shabbos in order to save the life of a fetus? If the fetus is not considered alive, how can saving it warrant a violation of Shabbos?

This leads us to the famous debate between the Tzitz Eliezer and Rav Moshe Feinstein:

The Tzitz Eliezer held that the chiyuv hatzalah is independent from the issue of abortion, and thus, even if there is a mitzvah to violate Shabbos in order to save the fetus, this would not indicate that there is an issur D'Oraisa to abort it. The Tzitz Eliezer therefore maintained that the issur of abortion would only be an issur Dirabanan.

Rav Moshe Feinstein, however, argued on this logic, and believed that the chiyuv hatzalah is completely connected to the issue of abortion. Therefore, he maintained that since you can violate shabbos to save a fetus, it must also be assur D'Oraisa to abort it.

The Root of Their Debate

The root of their debate seems to be as follows: Rav Moshe would base his approach in the fundamental importance of Shabbos. Because Shabbos is so important, if one is allowed to violate Shabbos to save a fetus, then it must also be Assur Di'Oraisa to abort it.

The Tzitz Eiezer, however, would argue that the ability to violate Shabbos to save a fetus is only a question of “potential,”[9] whereas the nature and severity of abortion is a question of its status "right now." Thus, even if one can violate Shabbos to save a fetus, it is still possible that abortion is not assur on a D'Oraisa level.

The Problem: But there is a Financial Penalty for Abortion?

There is another problem with Tosafos' shitah. The Torah says that the man who killed the fetus needs to pay a fine for the miscarriage that he caused. As such, it appears that there is at least some type of Issur D'Oraisa here?

However, this is not necessarily the case. The Gemara in Baba Kama (48b-49a) explains that the monetary obligation is accessed based on the value of the fetus, and then paid to the father. However, one of the most famous and fundamental questions regarding the sugya of nezikin (damages) is whether one who damages violates an aveirah, or whether there is simply a chiyuv (responsibility) to pay back the cost of the damage. If we hold the latter, then just like a loveh (borrower) has a chiyuv to pay back the loan, the mazik (damager) has a chiyuv to pay back the damage; but there is not necessarily an issur that is being violated.

Options for the Issur Dirabanan

If abortion is only an issur Dirabanan, there could be several possible options regarding the nature of the issur Dirabanan. In general, Dirabanans are either new restrictions created by Chazal, or they are Dirabanans that build off of an existing Issur D'Oraisa (K'ein Di'Oraisa).

If it was building off of an existing D'Oraisa, it could be building off of any of the following issurim that we already discussed above:

1. Retzichah
2. Chavalah
3. Gezel
4. Nezikin
5. Bittul Aseh of the Chiyuv of Hatzalah

Uber Yerech Imo:

The Fetus is Considered a “Limb” of its Mother 

There is a famous debate amongst Chazal about whether a fetus is considered a “limb” of its mother. The Gemara states as follows:

מסכת חולין דף נח עמוד א

רבי אליעזר סבר עובר ירך אמו הוא ור' יהושע סבר עובר לאו ירך אמו הוא

Rabbi Eliezer holds that a fetus is considered like the thigh of its mother and is rendered a tereifa as part of its body, and Rabbi Yehoshua holds that a fetus is not considered like the thigh of its mother.

Often, it has been assumed that this debate is fundamentally centered around the very question of whether a fetus is considered to be a full nefesh or not. However, upon analyzing both sides, one can actually use both opinions of “whether a fetus is considered a limb of its mother” to prove both sides of the debate regarding whether or not a fetus is considered to be a full nefesh. This can be seen as follows:

•  If we maintain that “Uber Yerech Imo – A Fetus is Considered to be a Limb of its Mother”

1. We could suggest that since the fetus is only a limb, and a limb is never considered to be a person, that the shitah of uber yerech imo is of the opinion that a fetus is not a nefesh.
2. Alternatively, we could suggest that the shitah of uber yerech imo is of the opinion that just like a limb is fully connected to one’s body, the fetus is similarly fully connected to the body of its mother; as such, the fetus would be gaining its nishmas chaim (life force) from its mother as well; thus, just as the mother of a fetus is fully alive, the fetus would similarly gain the same status in halacha as its mother, and be considered fully alive (and a full nefesh).

•  If we maintain that “Uber Lav Yerech Imo – A Fetus is Not Considered to be a Limb of its Mother”

1. We could suggest that since the fetus is not a limb of its mother, it is therefore considered to be a completely separate entity. As such, since it is a fully separate being, it must be considered fully alive (and a full nefesh).
2. Alternatively, we could suggest that since the fetus is not a limb of its mother, it is therefore not connected to the nishmas chaim (life force) of its mother, and it would therefore not yet be considered alive (or a full nefesh).

Thus, even though the sugya of “uber yerech imo” is a fascinating and important part of this sugya, it is most definitely not a clear proof to either side in the debate of whether a fetus is considered to be a nefesh.

In our next article, we will continue to analyze this fascinating halachic topic.

[1] Sanhedrin 74a.

[2] Even someone other than the mother of the fetus would be allowed to abort a fetus to save their own life.

[3] One could actually argue with this svara, and suggest that even if we take the view that a fetus is not a nefesh, it would still be assur to abort a fetus to save one’s life. We will discuss the various approaches to this sugya in future articles.

[4] While stealing may still be considered a subcategory of murder, as we will further develop in a future chapter, this is not the common approach.

[5] חידושי הרמב"ן מסכת נדה דף מד עמוד ב

והא דתנן וההורגו חייב. ודוקא בן יום אחד אבל עובר לא דלא קרינא ביה נפש אדם, וה"נ אמרינן בסנהדרין (ע"ב ב') האשה שהיא מקשה לילד מביאין סכין ומחתכין אותו אבר אבר יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש, אלמא מעיקרא ליכא משום הצלת נפש וקרא נמי כתיב דמשלם דמי ולדות, ואיכא דקשיא ליה מההיא דגרסינן התם בערכין (ז' ב') האשה שהיא יושבת על המשבר ומתה בשבת מביאין סכין וקורעין אותה ומוציאין הולד ממנה ואמאי מחללין שבת כיון שאינו קרוי נפש, וליכא למימר דהתם ביושבת על המשבר דוקא משום דכיון דעיקר גופא אחרינא הוא כדאיתמר התם בערכין, במקשה לילד לא בעינן יושבת על המשבר, ועוד דהכא בן יום אחד תנן, וקרא דגבי דמי ולדות אפילו ביושבת על המשבר היא ולא אמרינן התם דכילוד הוא, אלא גופא אחרינא הוא דקאמרינן לומר שממתינין לה עד שתלד ואח"כ ממיתין אותה, ולא מיתרבי מגם שניהם דאפילו קודם שתשב על המשבר כלל אי לאו קרא דגם לא הוה קטלינן לולד כדמפורש התם, אבל לענין לידה דבר ברור הוא שאינו בכלל נפש אדם עד שיוולד כדאמרינן, ולאו קושיא היא התם אמרה תורה חלל עליו שבת אחת כדי שיקיים שבתות הרבה, וההיא דאמרינן במס' שבת (קנ"א ב') תינוק בן יום אחד חי מחללין עליו את השבת לאו לאפוקי עובר אלא גוזמא היא כדי לומר דוד מלך ישראל מת אין מחללין עליו את השבת.

[6] See below, where Rav Moshe Feinstein and the Tzitz Eliezer debate this question.

[7] תוספות מסכת נדה דף מד עמוד ב 

(סנהדרין דף עב:) אשה המקשה חות אבר יצא ראשו אין דוחין נפש מפני נפש ומיהו אפשר דדוקא היכא דאמו חיה לא מיחייב הורגו עד שיצא ראשו שתלוי קצת בחיות אמו אבל היכא דמתה חייב משום דכמונח בקופסא דמי וא"ת אם תמצי לומר דמותר להורגו בבטן אפי' מתה אמו ולא הוי כמונח בקופסא אמאי מחללין עליו את השבת שמביאין סכין דרך ר"ה לקרוע האם כדמוכח בפ' קמא דערכין (דף ז:) וי"ל דמכל מקום משום פקוח נפש מחללין עליו את השבת אף ע"ג דמותר להרגו דהא גוסס בידי אדם ההורגו פטור כדאמר פרק הנשרפין (סנהדרין עח.) דרוב גוססים למיתה ומחללין את השבת עליו כדאמר פרק בתרא דיומא (ד' פד:) דאין מהלכין בפקוח נפש אחר הרוב.

[8] However, Rav Moshe Feinstein could not fathom that Tosafos would Paskin this way, so he believed this was a ta'os sofer.

[9] Chalal Shabbos Achas Kidei Lishmor Shabbasos Harbei.